





RESEARCH  REPORT 0124 
THE  GLASS CEILING  FOR  REWARDS: 
HOW IMPORTANT IS  GENDER IN  EXPLAINING 
DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS? 
by 
A.  GEVERS 
L.  SELS 
B.OVERLAET 
D/2001/2376/24 The glass ceiling for rewards: 
How important is gender in explaining differences in earnings? 
Ann Gevers  1  , Luc Seis2 & Bert Overiaee 
Abstract 
Women have made enormous gains in the past  few decades,  both in education and in 
the  workplace.  More  women  are  attending and graduating from  university than  in 
the  past.  They  are  also  moving  into professions  traditionally  dominated by  men. 
However,  a gender earnings gap is still evident.  Several studies have demonstrated 
the existence of  gender wage differentials that can or cannot be explained either by 
productivity-related  characteristics,  job  and/or  organization  characteristics.  The 
limitation of  many of  those studies is their focus on only one,  maximum two group(s) 
of  characteristics.  This paper improves on previous studies of  the explanation of  the 
gender  earnings  gap:  it  combines  the  three  groups  of characteristics  into  one 
regression model.  We  test whether male andfemale earnings differ after controlling 
for individual, job-related and organizational features and study the contribution of 
several  theoretical  explanations  of the  gender  wage  gap.  Neither  did previous 
empirical research focus on wage discrimination at different hierarchical levels and 
at  various  stages  of individuals'  careers.  This  article  answers  these  additional 
questions:  Do  earnings  differences  between  men  and  women  increase  with 
hierarchical level? Are women faced with a pay handicap at the starting line of  their 
career? Does the pay gap between men and women increase when work experience 
increases?  The  analysis  uses  data  from  the  Salary  survey,  organized  by  the 
Department of  Applied Economics and the job advertisement paper Vacature.  This 
large-scale survey generates pay details on a total of  more than 20500 white collar-
workers (in private and public, profit as well as non-profit sectors). 
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'x"omen  have made enormous gains in  the past few decades, both in  education and  in 
the workplace. More women are attending and graduating from university than in the 
past. They are also moving into professions traditionally dominated by men, although 
market segregation and a gender-earnings gap are still evident. 
Several  old  and  recent  studies  have  demonstrated  the  existence  of gender  wage 
differentials  that  can  or  cannot  be  explained  either  by  productivity-related 
characteristics, job or  organization  characteristics.  The  limitation  of many of those 
studies is  their focus on only one, maximum two group(s) of characteristics. Groshen 
(1991)  and Blau (1977)  did  consider  company  features  in  the  examination  of the 
gender earnings gap, but did not examine whether differences in women's and men's 
human capital were behind the gender gaps found.  Ashraf (1996)  views  the  gender 
wage gap as the sum of differences owing to observed traits of men and women and 
unexplained differences, which  are  often  attributed to  discrimination. Graham et al. 
(2000)  and  Monk-Turner  &  Turner  (2000)  refer  to  human  capital  and  employer 
characteristics in explaining gender differences in (starting) salaries. They did not take 
into account job features. 
This article  improves on  previous studies of the explanation of the  gender earnings 
gap: it combines the three groups of characteristics into one regression model. We test 
whether male and female earnings differ after controlling for  individual, job-related 
and  organizational  features.  We  build  our  model  progressively.  We  study  the 
contribution of several theoretical explanations of the gender wage gap. Is the gender 
wage  gap  due to  differences  in  the  human  capital  of men  and  women? Are  wages 
between men and women different because of job segmentation processes?  Do men 
and women have different utility functions? Through a combination of individual, job 
and  organization  characteristics  in  one  model,  this  paper  seeks  to  refine  prior 
estimates of the gender wage gap. 
2 Neither did previous research focus  on  wage discrimination  at  different hierarchical 
levels and at various stages of individuals' careers. Authors have illustrated situations 
in  which  disadvantages  women  face  relative  to  men  intensify  as  they  move  up 
organizational  hierarchies.  Yet,  they  only  studied  patterns  of  promotion  of  men 
relative  to  women  (Baxter  &  Wright,  2000).  None  of  these  studies  examined 
increasing wage inequalities when moving up the hierarchical ladder.  In  the scientific 
literature we find evidence of differences in  starting salaries between men and women 
(Graham et  a!.,  2000; Duncan &  Prus,  1992). However,  we  are  unaware of a study 
providing robust  statistical  evidence  of the  increasing  gender wage  gap  as  careers 
progress. Graham et a!.  (2000) have only intuitively written that starters may be less 
susceptible to discriminatory forces with respect to pay. 
Apart from refining prior estimates of the gender wage gap, this article answers these 
additional questions:  Do earnings differences between men  and  women  increase or 
decrease with hierarchical level? Are women faced with a pay handicap at the starting 
line of their career? Does the pay gap between men and  women increase or decrease 
when work experience increases? 
The analysis uses data from a Salary Survey, organized by the Department of Applied 
Economics of the KU Leuven and the job advertisement paper Vacature. It is a large-
scale survey, which generates pay details on a total of more than 20500 white collar-
workers (in private and public, profit as well as non-profit sectors). 
The next section of the paper briefly outlines the methodology. The regression model 
is then explained in which individual, job-related and organizational pay determinants 
are included stepwise. In section four we run separate regressions for individuals from 
different hierarchical levels and report the differences in  the gender coefficients. In  a 
fifth section we compare the gender wage gap among two groups of respondents: one 
group that just entered the labor market and another group  that already has  between 
15 and 25 years of work experience. We finish this paper with a summary of the main 
results. 
3 2.  Survey design 
Several attempts have been made in  the past to  gain  an  insight into pay levels using 
random samples. These attempts usually generated a very low response. Moreover, it 
is  striking  that  in  many  surveys  the  item  non-response  to  pay-related  questions  is 
extremely high.  This  means  that  until  recently  the  only  source of data on  earnings 
available  in  Belgium  was  those  produced  by  the  National  Institute  for  Statistics. 
However, these data are  subject to limitations, since companies with fewer than ten 
employees and  organizations from  extremely important sectors such as  health care, 
education,  government  administration  and  not-for-profit  are  excluded.  Moreover, 
these databases do not lend themselves to explanatory analyses, since they contain no 
information on the most essential person and job-related pay determinants. 
For these  reasons  we  deliberately  opted  to  abandon  the  random  sample  approach 
(which  would  anyway  have  been  limited  due  to  cost considerations).  The  survey, 
which forms the basis for this paper, was distributed via the job advertisement paper 
Vacature,  which  has  a very  high  circulation among  all  hierarchical and educational 
levels  of white-collar  workers.  It produced the  very  high  response  of 20510  valid 
measurement points, but does create the problem that the sample reliability is almost 
impossible to  determine.  That clearly  limits  the  scope for  statistical  generalization 
(Sels  et  a!.,  2000).  However,  this  limitation  applies  to  all  employee-based  (non-
administrative) wage surveys. The fact that a random sample was  not used does not 
mean that no effort was made to define clearly the survey population or the empirical 
field of validity when building the Salary Survey. Blue-collar workers  are excluded 
from this population. The results relate solely to  white-collars (including all ranks of 
management). Part-time workers are also ruled out. The analyses concentrate on full-
time employment in order to achieve a certain standardization of working hours. 
One intervention  was  made in  order to improve  the  fit  between the  distributions of 
sample and population: the  systematic re-weighting of the salary data. Not all groups 
in the labor force participated in the Salary Survey to an equal extent. Certain groups, 
such  as  the more highly educated, were over-represented. The salary data generated 
by the survey were therefore re-weighted on the basis of 'educational level' . This was 
4 done  using the program Weight 2.1  for  Windows (Hajnal,  1995),  a program for re-
weighting samples on  the  basis of population statistics. The re-weighting allows the 
following  important question to  be  answered:  Suppose that  the  educational level of 
the  respondents \vas  identical to that of the  \vage-earning labor force, ho\v  \vould the 
pay differentials then look? However, we have to acknowledge that this re-weighting 
cannot neutralize problems of self-selection (Sels et aI.,  2000). Self-selection can for 
example imply that  someone who  considers  himself successful  is  more  inclined to 
report that success through participation in this type of survey. 
A final  methodological note relates to  the precise meaning of the term 'pay' in this 
paper.  By  'pay'  we  understand  remuneration  for  labor,  formed  in  an  employment 
relationship with an employer. The independent variable in the analyses is  always the 
natural  logarithm of the  gross  monthly pay.  The gross pay is  the  basic  pay of the 
employee,  before  any  fiscal  or  social  security  deductions.  This  amount  not  only 
includes the hours of work performed, but also the hours of absence during illness or 
holiday,  for  which  the  employee  retains  the  right  to  normal  pay.  It  also  includes 
overtime pay,  as  well  as  an  estimate in  monetary terms  of various fringe  benefits. 
Premiums,  incentives,  bonuses,  commission  and  similar  income  items  are  also 
included in this amount. 
5 3.  Male-female wage differentials 
Before  testing  different  explanations  for  the  wage  gap,  we  firstly  compute  the 
magnitude of the wage differential between men and women. Since other variables are 
not kept under control, we simply compare the average and median wages of men and 
women in  our sample. Table 1 shows the wage gap between men and women, in total 
and for each hierarchical level. 
































We defined three hierarchical levels: operational staff, professionals and management. 
The management level consists of the heads of the corporate departments who report 
directly  to  the  general  manager,  and  the  managers  who  are  in  charge  of 
implementation  but do  not report  directly  to the  general  director.  Professionals  are 
employees  in  staff departments  or  staff positions  (also  professors  and  consultants 
belong to this category). Finally, operational staff is understood as workers who carry 
out a clearly defined task in a subordinate role. 
Table  1 clearly shows that women earn  less, on  average, than  men.  The coefficient 
Women / Men (WIM) indicates that a woman's pay is  about 76.3 % of a man's pay. 
Across  the  European  Union  and  Norway,  women's  earnings  are  around  79  %  of 
men's. Some 25 years after the adoption of the EU Equal Pay Directive, the wage gap 
between  women  and  men  still  averages  some 21  %  across  the  EU (plus  Norway) 
(European  Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of  Living  and  Working  Conditions, 
2001). This foundation also presents figures for Belgium: female white-collar workers 
earn 71.7 % of male white-collar workers.  The wage gap between men and women is 
large  at  all  hierarchical  levels,  although  the  gap  increases  when  climbing  up  the 
6 hierarchical stairs. While the wage  differentials at operational and professional level 
are  alike,  female  managers,  however,  earn  much  less  than  their  male  colleagues. 
When we  compare these figures  with the 0.72 median female-male  salary ratio for 
managerial  and professional specialty jobs in  the  U.S.  economy,  it seems that our 
female-male salary ratios are higher (Graham et aI., 2000). 
In what follows we take a closer look on the gender wage gap and its explanations. In 
order to assess the relative importance of gender on pay differentials, we make use of 
linear regression, in which the natural logarithm of the gross monthly pay will serve 
as dependent variable. Through inclusion of several variables into the model we try to 
test  some  hypotheses.  In  3.1  we  test  whether  wage  differences  between  men  and 
women are due  to differences  in  human capital.  Can differences  in human capital 
factors such as educational level and work experience explain the wage gap between 
men  and  women?  In  3.2  we  include  job  features  into  the  model.  The  second 
hypothesis states that men  and women, with the same human capital, who work in 
similar  jobs,  earn  the  same.  In  3.3  we  complete  our  model  by  including  two 
organizational features. We test whether the wage gap between men and women will 
disappear after controlling for human capital, job and organizational characteristics. 
Modell  Model II  Model III 
I.  Educational level  I.  Educational level  I.  Educational level 
2.  Work experience  2.  Work experience  2.  Work experience 
3.  Gender  3.  Gender  3.  Gender 
4.  Hierarchical level  4.  Hierarchical level 
5.  Functional domain  5.  Functional domain 
6.  Number of subordinates  6.  Number of subordinates 
7.  Size of budget managed  7.  Size of budget managed 
8.  Responsibility in the job  8.  Responsibility in the job 
9.  Job autonomy  9.  Job autonomy 
10.  Complexity of the job  10.  Complexity of the job 
II.  Sector of employment 
12.  Size of the organization 
7 3.1  Human-capital explanation of male-female wage differentials 
The human  capital theory  is  known  as  a competitive model.  This  model  states that 
\XJage  differentials  are  explained  by  differences  in  the  supply  side  of the  market, 
namely differences in  worker productivity, and particularly by differences in level of 
formal education, cognitive skill, labor market experience, and on-the-job training. It 
is  the  combination of factors  such  as  these  that comprises  an  individual's level  of 
human capital (Graham et aI., 2000). It refers to  the qualities the individual brings to 
the  workplace.  In  the  standard  wage  function  of the  human  capital  theory,  wage 
differences  are  mainly  explained  on  the  basis  of  work  experience  (Duncan  & 
Hoffman,  1978; Holzer,  1990;  Strober,  1990; Williams,  1991)  and educational level 
(Strober, 1990; Nollen & Gaertner, 1991; Mincer, 1993; Weiss, 1995). 
If  the educational level of women would be lower on average and if they would have 
less work experience than  men, then it is  possible that differences in human capital 
can help explain differences in wages between men and women. Before looking at the 
regression  analysis,  we  shortly  examined  whether  there  exist  differences  in 
educational level between men and women. The following table shows the number of 
women and men in the Belgian labor population having a particular educational level. 
It seems that relatively more men than women have a university degree or a degree of 
higher education  :2:  4 years.  But also more men  than  women  have only a degree of 
secondary education or lower.  On  average, men and women probably have the same 
quantity of education. 
Table 2: Number of  working men and women with different educational levels in Belgium 
Men  Women 
Secondary education or lower  1635810 (72.05%)  976326 (61.52%) 
Higher education < 4 years  267538 (11.78%)  392809 (24.75%) 
Higher education ~  4 years  114151 (5.03%)  70485 (4.44%) 
University  252885 (11.14%)  147458 (9.29%) 
Total of working population  2270384 (100%)  1587078 (100%) 
Source: Labor force survey - N.I.S. (1999) 
8 An  important question  is  whether the detected  wage  gap  between men  and women 
remains  after controlling for  differences  in  educational  level  and  work  experience. 
Our first hypothesis states: men and women are paid differently, but this wage gap 
is  a  reflection of differences  in  their  human  capital,  caused  by  differences  in 
educational level and work experience. In  other words,  men  and women  with the 
same amount of work experience and the same educational level are equally paid. 
We test this reasoning through a relatively simple linear regression model, in  which 
the natural logarithm of the gross monthly pay will serve as  dependent variable. As 
independent variables we include: 
•  Highest educational  level  reached - secondary education  or lower  is  used as 
reference category. 
Number of years of work experience - this  variable is  included both linearly 
and quadratically in  order to test whether the relationship between wages and 
work experience is linear, concave or convex. 
Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman). 
Table 3: Linear regression with the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage as 
dependent variable 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter 
logarithmic transformation  estimate 
Unstandardized  Standardized  Unstandardized  Standardized 
Intercept  11.083**  0  1613  I 
Work experience  .039**  .991  1.039  2.694 
Work experience2  -.0006**  -.535  0.999  0.586 
Degree of higher education  .103**  .123  1.108  1.131 
outside university «  4 years) 
Degree of higher education 
.254**  .225  1.289  1.252  outside university (<: 4 years) 
University degree  .378*'  .443  1.459  1.557 
Gender (man = 0; woman =  1)  -.187**  -.221  0.829  0.802 
R2 = .408; Adj. R2 = .408  "'*p < 0.001 
9 The explaining pow~r  of these classic 'human capital' -determinants, educational level 
and work experience, is rather large. Together with gender, they explain 40.8 % of the 
total variance in wages. 
Our analysis proves the importance of educational level as a determinant of pay level. 
The results show that a white-collar employee, who  graduated at  university, will be 
paid 45.9  %  more on  average  than  an  employee with  a secondary  (or even  lower) 
educational background. Work experience and gender are kept under control. Part of 
the reason why those who are better educated earn more than those who are not stems 
from  the  skills  training  and  consequent  productivity  increase  derived  from  their 
education.  But  those  who  are  better  educated  earn  more  also  because  of  their 
relatively higher class background and because their education gives them entry to job 
ladders containing the  more  desirable  and higher-paying jobs (Strober,  1990).  The 
high impact of education on  wages  does  not necessarily confirm the human capital 
theory.  There  exist  many  theories  that  do  not  explain  the  relationship  between 
education and wages  by referring to  increased productivity,  but as  a result of other 
behavioral relationships. One example of such an  alternative theory  is  the signaling 
model  (Strober,  1990;  Arrow,  1973;  Spence,  1974).  According  to  this  model, 
employers believe that higher productivity is a function  not of the skills that workers 
learned in  school,  but rather of the  amount of capital  that employees have to  work 
with, the amount and type of on-the-job training that they receive and,  the ability of 
the worker to  absorb  training.  Education,  according  to  Thurow  (1975),  is  used by 
employers as a signal of trainability. 
The  human  capital  theory  also  explains  pay  differentials  on  the  basis  of  work 
experience. It is argued that the productivity of a worker or the value of his/her human 
capital  increases  with  work  experience.  The  amount  of work  experience  is  often 
considered as  a proxy for an unobservable investment in  on-the-job training (Duncan 
&  Hofmann,  1978). Some of the positive relationship between work experience and 
earnings comes  from  employer-designed  pay schemes  aimed  at  reducing employee 
turnover  and  shirking.  And  some  derives  from  the  fact  that  workers  with  high 
seniority may  be better workers w begin  with,  are  in  better jobs, or may be in jobs 
10 where  the  job  requirements  and  their  own  characteristics  are  particularly  well-
matched  (Strober,  1990).  Our  analysis  shows  indeed  that  wages  rise  with  work 
experience, a result that is  consistent with earlier research (Hartog,  1986; Pfeffer & 
Davis-Blake, 1990). Experience, however, also ages. As a consequence, pay rises due 
to increasing work experience reduce over time. The relationship between wages and 
work experience is concave. 
The  most  important conclusion  from  the  previous  analysis  is  that gender explains 
wage differences in  a statistically significant way.  Women earn, ceteris paribus,  17.1 
% «(1  - 0.829) * 100) less than men. We have not taken into account job-related and 
organization characteristics. As we will see in the following part, men and women are 
not equally represented in all jobs and industries. 
Human  capital  theory interprets the  gender earnings  differential  as  stemming from 
women's own choices. Women choose to obtain less education of the type that has a 
high pay-off (cf. infra). Holding the type of education constant, they choose to obtain 
jobs that have low levels of on-the-job training.  And they choose to withdraw from 
the  labor  force  periodically  in  order  to  raise  children.  To  try  to  increase  the 
female/male  earnings ratio through  public policy  would,  in  the  view of the  human 
capital  theorists,  interfere  with  the  efficient  allocation  of  resources  now  being 
performed by labor markets. They follow the reasoning that in  a perfect world pay is 
determined by merit, which in turn is defined by variables, such as formal education, 
cognitive skill, labor market experience, and on-the-job training (Polachek, 1987). 
Women's expected discontinuous labor force participation leads them not to invest in 
much on the job-training, because they do  not expect to be  in  the labor market long 
enough  for such training to payoff. It also  reduces  the incentives  of employers to 
invest in furthering women's skills in the marketplace. Women's actual discontinuous 
labor force participation causes their labor force  skills to depreciate (Mincer,  1993). 
This  is  only  one,  and  not even  the  most  obvious,  explanation  for  the  wage  gap 
between men and women (Sels et ai., 2000). 
11 In  our analysis, we observe that a wage gap between men and women still exists after 
controlling for work experience and educational level. Women with the same amount 
of work experience and the same educational level than men are still paid 17.1 % less. 
We have to reject the first  hypothesis"  In  other words earnings differences  between 
men and women cannot be  fully explained by the classic human capital factors such 
as  educational level and work experience. Therefore we  will  extend our model  with 
some job-related  variables  (part  3.2).  Nevertheless,  the  inclusion  of the  standard 
human  capital  variables  has  reduced  the  gender  wage  gap  with  approximately  6 
percent. We started our analyses with an observed gender wage differential of 23.7 %. 
3.2 Wage gap between men and women: explained by differences in jobs? 
In  the previous part we concluded that a wage gap is  still present after controlling for 
work experience and educational level.  A second potential explanation for the wage 
gap concentrates on differences in jobs exercised by women and men. Several authors 
mention "segmentation processes" in  which women are excluded from higher-paying 
jobs and are  crowded into  those that pay  less (Strober,  1990;  Solberg &  Laughlin, 
1995; Chauvin & Ash, 1994). 
If women are  indeed more frequently found  in  relatively lower-paid administrative 
jobs and are less represented in well-paid management and professional jobs, then it is 
possible that differences in job characteristics can help explain differences in wages 
between  men  and  women.  We formulate  the  following  hypothesis:  the wage  gap 
between men and women will disappear if we include into our regression model, 
not only the human capital factors, but also job-related characteristics. 
12 Our second model will be the same as our first model, only extended with job-related 
characteristics: 
•  Hierarchical level: management, professionals, and operational staff (= reference 
category). 
•  Functional  domain  (general  management,  marketing,  engineering,  R&D,  etc., 
with after-sales service as reference category). 
Number  of subordinates  (1-5;  6-15;  16-30;  more  than  30;  the  group  without 
subordinates is the reference category). 
Size of budget managed (budget managed of EUR 25000 or less; budget of more 
than EUR 25000;  employees  who do not manage a budget form the  reference 
category). 
•  Responsibility  in  the  job  (ten-point  scale  on  the  basis  of factor  analysis;  see 
appendix). 
•  Complexity  of the  job  (ten-point  scale  on  the  basis  of factor  analysis;  see 
appendix). 
•  Job autonomy (ten-point scale on the basis of factor analysis; see appendix). 
13 Table 4:  Linear regression (natural logarithm of gross monthlv wage = dependent variable) 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter 
logarithmic transformation  estimate 
Unstandardized  Standardized  U  nstandardized  Standardized 
Intercept  10.836**  0  1260  1 
Wark experience  .0288**  .714  1.029  2.042 
Work experience'  -.0003**  -.322  0.999  0.725 
Degree of higher education  .071**  .085  1.074  1.089 
outside university «  4 years) 
Degree of higher education 
.154**  .137  1.166  1.147  outside university (;0 4 years) 
University degree  .247**  .290  1.280  1.336 
Gender (man = 0; woman = 1)  -.094**  -.111  0.910  0.895 
Professional  .0922**  .105  1.097  1.111 
Management  .227**  .273  1.255  1.314 
Information technology  .124**  .092  1.132  1.096 
R&D  .109**  .059  1.115  1.061 
General management  .104**  .078  1.109  1.081 
Engineering  .071**  .034  1.074  1.035 
Marketing  .067**  .034  1.069  1.035 
Sales  .053**  .048  1.054  1.049 
Finance / bookkeeping  .047**  .033  1.048  1.034 
Technical support  .034*  .023  1.034  1.023 
Operations  .029*  .024  1.029  1.024 
Logistics, HRM, Administration  (n.s.) 
Budget managed ~  EUR 25000  .032**  .026  1.033  1.026 
Budget of more than EUR 25000  .118**  .098  1.125  1.103 
1 - 5 subordinate(s)  .016*  .018  1.016  1.018 
6 - 15 subordinates  .045**  .038  1.046  1.039 
16 - 30 subordinates  .044**  .024  1.045  1.024 
More than 30 subordinates  .089**  .058  1093  1.060 
Complexity of the job  .017**  .075  1.017  1.078 
Responsibility  .002 (n.s.)  .012  1.002  1.012 
Job autonomy  .009**  .046  1.009  1.047 
R' = .558; Adj. R' = .557  **  P < 0.001; * P < 0.01; n.s.  not significant 
14 After  inclusion  of the  job-related factors,  the  explaining  power  of the  regression 
model increases from 40.8 % (model  1) to 55.8  %.  This rise in  explaining power is 
probably  due  to  the  extensive  number  of  job-related  characteristics  used.  Most 
research  does  only  take  into  account  a limited  number  of job-related  factors,  e.g. 
hierarchical level (Rosenbaum, 1980; Hartog, 1986). 
Our model distinguishes between three hierarchical levels. All things being equal, the 
gross  monthly  pay  of  professionals  is,  on  average,  9.7%  higher  than  that  of 
operational staff. Managers earn on  average 25.5% more than operational staff. Pay 
differences  occur  not  only  between  hierarchical  levels.  The jimctional  domain  to 
which a job belongs can also help determine the employee's monthly pay. The table 
shows that wages in information technology are on  average 13.2 % higher than those 
in  after-sales, our reference category. Employers  in  R&D are paid,  ceteris  paribus, 
11.5  %  more  than  their  colleagues  of after-sales.  In  general,  the  pay  differential 
between functional domains is rather limited. In terms of remuneration, it makes little 
difference  whether  an  employee  builds  a  career  in  personnel  management  or  in 
administration or logistics, for example. The number of  subordinates and the size of 
the budget managed are two job-related characteristics that seem to have an additional 
impact on pay levels if we control for differences in hierarchical level. 
The factors 'responsibility in the job', 'autonomy'  and 'degree of  complexity'  are the 
results  of a  personal  assessment by  the  respondents.  It can  be  deduced  from  the 
analysis that a high degree of autonomy and complexity are accompanied (all things 
being equal) by significant higher pay. 
The most important conclusion from the second regression analysis is that gender still 
has  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  wages,  even  after  controlling  for  human 
capital  factors  and  job-related  characteristics.  We  have  to  reject  our  second 
hypothesis.  The  wage  gap  between  men  and  women  nevertheless  decreases  from 
17.1 % (model  1)  to  9%  if job-related characteristics are  included. In other words, a 
substantial  part  of the  wage  gap  between  men  and  women  can  be  explained  by 
differences in  men's and women's jobs.  These jobs probably differ with  respect to 
15 hierarchical  level,  functional  domain,  job  autonomy  and  complexity,  number  of 
subordinates, and the size of the budget managed. The system of job grading, which is 
related to hierarchical levels, is also considered as  having a potential to  affect gender 
pay inequalities in other research (F_ubery et a!.,  1997). 
Our results show that men and women are positioned, to a certain extent, in different 
jobs. Solberg and Lauglin (1995) use the term "crowding" to indicate that women are 
positioned  in  lower-paid  jobs.  One  possible  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  is 
segmentation. Segmentation should be seen as  a collective name for processes, which 
lead to  a limitation  of the competition for jobs.  This means that certain  (types)  of 
workers have more difficulty in gaining access to certain (types) of jobs (with a given 
pay level), because employers select candidates on the basis of individual or group 
characteristics (Glebbeek,  1993).  The  selection  criteria adopted may be  applied  so 
systematically that they result in a segmentation of workers, a segmentation according 
to the type of jobs for which they are eligible. It is not only workers but also jobs that 
are segmented, by the types of position for which they form a good springboard. This 
segmentation of  jobs gives rise to career paths or job chains. 
Segmentation  of workers  means  that  individual  or group  characteristics  determine 
which jobs these workers can attain. Processes of statistical discrimination can playa 
particular role here. Statistical discrimination occurs primarily where employers have 
imperfect information  about the productivity of candidate employees  and  therefore 
use  characteristics  of  the  employee  as  a  source  of  information  about  his/her 
productivity (Davidson &  Burke, 1994). It is  thus possible that employers assess the 
'attraction' of women lower during recruitment and when determining pay levels, for 
example  because  they  expect  women  to  interrupt  their  careers  more  frequently 
(Graham et aI.,  2000).  Reference  is  made  to  statistical  discrimination among  other 
things in  the  'labor queue' theory.  Selection occurs not so much on  the  basis of an 
assessment of individual  qualities,  but on  the  basis  of group  averages  (Solberg  & 
Laughlin, 1995). This gives rise to  a 'labor queue' which can vary per job group, but 
which  nevertheless  means  that  people  with  a  lower  level  of education,  women, 
members of ethnic minorities, etc. are often at the end of the queue when it comes to 
16 jobs  with  the  highest  pay  and/or  the  best  career  prospects.  This  segmentation  of 
female workers can be reinforced by an  existing segmentation of  jobs. For example, 
statistical discrimination at  the  'entry level'  may  mean that women more frequently 
end up  in  positions \vhich  form  part of a less promising job chain or career path  and 
which  in  this  sense  provide  a  less  resilient  springboard  to  higher  and  better-paid 
positions (Benschop, 1996). 
It is possible that segmentation processes partly offer an explanation for the wage gap. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether women perform certain jobs because they 
are excluded from better-paid jobs with more career prospects, or because they prefer 
to do those jobs. Differences in preferences for certain types of jobs can also account 
for  a substantial  portion  of the  earnings  gap  between  men  and  women.  It is  very 
difficult,  if not impossible,  to  determine the  degree  to  which  these preferences  are 
shaped by discrimination (Gunderson, 1989). In  other words, is crowding caused by a 
discriminatory conspiracy or by individual worker choice? 
Besides,  we  cannot overemphasize  the  impact  of job characteristics on  the  gender 
wage  gap  since  differences  between  men's  and  women's  wages  still  exist  in  this 
second  model.  In  a  following  part  we  will  investigate  whether  the  sector  of 
employment  and  the size  of the  employer can  contribute to  the explanation of the 
gender wage gap. 
3.3 Do men and women work in different organizations? 
Research  into the determinants of pay levels  has  long ignored characteristics on  the 
demand  side  of the  labor  market.  Nevertheless,  researchers  who  did  look  at  the 
demand-side factors proved that different employers pay employees with comparable 
human capital different amounts (Groshen, 1991; BJau, 1977; Gunderson, 1989). 
The wage gap between men and women can be partly due to  the fact that women are 
more represented in  low-paying organizations (Fields  &  Wolff,  1995).  Under those 
circumstances,  we  cannot speak of direct discrimination, but rather of segmentation 
17 between employers on  the  labor market.  Since our Salary Survey  does  not provide 
many data on the characteristics of the employer, we cannot conclude much about the 
importance of the demand-side factors in explaining the gender wage gap. We add the 
variables  "size of the  organization" and "sector of employment" into our regression 
model. 
Earlier research (Hodson &  England,  1986; Groshen,  1991) already stipulated that a 
large  part of the  gender wage  gap  resulted  from  differences  in  the  distribution  of 
employed  men  and  women  across  industries.  Roos  (1981),  in  contrast, found  that 
gender  differences  in  employment  across  industries  explained  only  0.4  %  of the 
overall wage gap. The following table shows the number of men and women working 
in  diverse sectors in  Belgium. The table is  limited to  white-collar workers, as is our 
sample. 
Table 5: Number of men and women working in diverse sectors in Belgium 
Men  Women 
Hotel and catering  5155  6052 
Public services  6332  9034 
Retail  133261  175272 
Telecommunication  8720  4855 
Transport  23575  22418 
Services to companies  72490  89461 
Textile  4592  4844 
Health care  33182  14003 I 
Building industry  16464  8214 
Wood and paper  12701  10179 
Food industry  14202  15671 
Education  441254  596307 
Metal industry  56972  16244 
Information technology  25607  8850 
18 Banks and insurance  65040  57690 
Chemical industry  26985  12155 
Socio-cultural sector  12362  9050 
Source: Rijksdienst voor de Sociale Zekerheid (Number of private sector employers and employees, 
registrated in  Social Security at 31103/00), Openbare Instellingen van de Soc. Zekerheid 
It seems that in  Belgium women are over-represented in  health care, service sectors 
(retail,  services  to  companies,  etc.),  and  education.  Typically  male  industries  are 
information technology, the metal and the chemical industry. Women and men study 
different fields in school or at university: women often end up as teachers, nurses and 
office  workers,  men  as  engineers  or  IT  specialists.  Figures  from  the  KU  Leuven 
indeed show that  students  in technical  education  (e.g.,  engineering and information 
technology) are predominantly male. Women are more represented in arts, pedagogy, 
psychology, and the medical sciences. 
With respect to  the size of the organization, we  looked up the  number of men and 
women employed in organizations of different size (table 6). In Belgium more women 
than  men  are  employed  in  small  companies  with  50  employees  or  less.  Other 
differences are small. 
Table 6: Number of men and women working in organizations of different size in Belgium 
Men  Women 
50 employees or less  198333  268158 
50 < employees ~  200  104607  95973 
200 < employees ~  500  72361  70074 
500 < employees S 1000  44898  51518 
More than 1000 employees  143161  133443 
Source: Rijksdienst voor de Sociale Zekerheid (Number of private sector employers and employees, 
registrated in  Social Security at 31103/00), Openbare Instellingen van de Soc. Zekerheid 
19 As far as  we know, research  about the distribution of men and women over firms of 
different size is  rare. We only found  one hypothesis, formulated by Fields &  Wolff 
(1995), that states: "there may be different distributions of male and female workers 
oVer  firms  within  industries,  with  larger  firms  paying  higher  \V'ages  and  relatively 
fewer female workers in the large firms". 
In  the following regression model, we  test whether the wage gap between men and 
women disappears after including human capital, job-related and organizational 
determinants (hypothesis 3). 
20 Table 7:  Linear regression with the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage as dependent 
variable 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter 
logarithmic transformation  estimate 
U nstandardized  Standardized  Unstandardized  Standardized 
Intercept  10.635*'  0  1031  I 
Work experience  .0285**  .707  1.029  2.028 
Work experience2  -.0004**  -.310  0.999  0.733 
Degree of higher education  .071 '*  .084  1.073  1.088 
outside university «  4 years) 
Degree of higher education 
.145'*  .129  1.156  1.138 
outside university (2': 4 years) 
University degree  .241**  .283  1.273  1.327 
Gender (man =  0; woman = I)  -.084**  -.099  0.919  0.906 
Professional  .098**  ,III  1.103  1.117 
Management  .225**  .270  1.252  1.310 
General management  .091**  .068  1.095  1.070 
Information technology  .069**  .051  1.072  1.052 
R&D  .054**  .029  1.055  1.029 
Logistics, HRM, Administration, 
Marketing, Sales, Finance /  (n.s.) 
bookkeeping, Technical support, 
Operations, Engineering 
Budget managed::; EUR 25000  .028**  .023  1,028  1.023 
Budget of more than EUR 25000  .I  08**  .089  1.114  1.093 
I - 5 subordinate(  s)  .022*'  ,025  1.023  1.025 
6 - 15 subordinates  .042**  .035  1.042  1.036 
16 - 30 subordinates  .042**  .023  1,043  1.023 
More than 30 subordinates  ,090**  .058  1,094  1,060 
Complexity of the job  .015**  .064  1.015  1,066 
Responsibility  .004**  .024  1.004  1.024 
Job autonomy  .010*'  ,050  1.010  1.051 
At least 50 employees  ,057**  .058  1.060  1.060 
At least 200 employees  .073*'  .063  1.076  1.065 
At least 500 employees  .087"  .064  1.091  1.066 
At least 1000 employees  .113**  ,141  1.120  1.151 
21 Pharmaceutical sector  .292**  .117  1.339  1.124 
Chemical industry  .275**  .176  1.317  1.192 
Telecommunication  .216**  .120  1.241  1.128 
Information technology  .200**  .160  1.221  1.174 
Banks and insurance  .183**  .143  1.201  1.154 
Metal industry  .177**  .131  1.194  1.140 
Food industry  .173*'  .078  1.189  1.081 
Media and marketing sector  .169**  .071  1.184  1.074 
Textile  .167**  .053  1.182  1.054 
Transport  .164**  .071  1.178  1.074 
Building industry  .141 *- .058  1.151  1.060 
Wood and paper  .141*- .047  1.151  1.048 
Services to companies  .134-- .099  1.143  1.104 
Retail  .124*- .075  1.132  1.078 
Education  .118-'  .076  1.125  1.079 
Health care  .117**  .070  1.124  1.073 
Public services  .060'- .046  1.061  1.047 
Hotel and catering  (n.s.) 
R2 = .597; Adj. R2 = .596  -- p < 0.001; n.s. not significant 
This  full  model,  consisting  of  human  capital,  job-related  and  company-related 
variables,  explains  almost  60  %  of the  total  variance  in  wages.  With  respect  to 
industry as  a  wage determinant,  we  may  conclude that there  are  strong  significant 
differences between industry wages, even after controlling for important determinants 
such  as  gender,  work  experience,  level  of education,  etc.  (in  other  words  after 
controlling for compositional effects). In the pay hierarchy (highest pay to lowest), the 
top  five  positions  are  taken  by the  pharmaceutical  industry,  the chemical  industry, 
telecommunication, information technology, and banks and insurance companies. The 
socio-cultural  sector  was  chosen  as  the  reference  category.  Wages  in  the 
pharmaceutical  industry  are  on  average  33.91  %  higher  than  those  in  the  socio-
cultural  sector.  The  picture  of  strong  sectoral  pay  differentiation  in  Belgium  is 
confirmed  in  international  comparisons  (Van  der  Wiel,  1999).  Many  barriers  can 
reduce the capacity or willingness of employees to  transfer to better-paying sectors. 
The result then is market segregation (Sels et aI., 2000). 
22 The regression analysis  also teaches us  that large companies, all  things being equal, 
pay  better.  The  gross  monthly  pay  in  companies  with  at  least  500  employees,  for 
example,  is  24.32  %  higher than  in  companies with  less  than  50 workers  (1.059 * 
1.076 * 1.091). Several studies report this positive effect of cOinpany size on  wages 
(Brown & Medoff, 1989; Springael et aI.,  1998). 
One  limitation  of  our  regression  model  is  that  we  cannot  measure  gender  wage 
differentials within companies. The only organizational determinants included in the 
analysis  are  company  size  and sector of employment.  Wage differences  by  gender, 
however,  are much smaller within companies than  between  companies  (Chauvin  & 
Ash, 1994). 
We nevertheless try  to figure  out how  many men and women in  our survey believe 
that gender wage differences exist in  their company. The following table shows the 
results. 
Table 8:  Perceptions of wage differences between men and women in a similar job 
Yes, there are  No, there are no  Not applicable 
differences  differences 
Men  15.4 %  64.8 %  19.8 % 
Women  30.2%  50.3%  19.5% 
It  appears  that  in  our survey  twice  as  much of the  women  get  the  impression that 
wages  differ  between  sexes  in  their company.  More  than  thirty  percent  of female 
respondents think that their male colleagues doing a similar job receive a wage that 
differs from  theirs. Further analyses show that a large part of the women perceiving 
wage  differences  between  sexes  are  employed  in  typically  male  industries 
(information technology, metal and chemical industry). However, this is  no proof of 
larger wage differences in these sectors. 
23 The previous regression model (table 7) shows that women  are  still paid 8.1  % less 
than  men,  if  we  control  for  individual  factors,  job-related  and  organizational 
characteristics. In other words: a woman with the same educational level and amount 
of work experience is  paid  8.1 % less than  a man  in  the  same functional  domain,  on 
the same hierarchical level, with the same number of subordinates and the same size 
of budget managed,  performing an  equally complex job,  with  a  certain  amount  of 
autonomy and responsibility, for an equally large employer in  the same sector. The 
wage  gap  has  nevertheless  diminished.  We  started our  analyses  with  an  observed 
gender  wage  gap  of approximately  23  %  (table  J).  This  difference  falls,  after 
including  some  human  capital  factors,  to  17.1  %  (table  3).  When  we  take  job 
differences into account, this gender wage gap further drops to 9 % (table 4). The full 
regression model shows that a wage difference of 8.1  % between men and women still 
exists, when human capital factors, job-related and organizational characteristics are 
kept  constant.  We  are  able  to  explain  almost  two  thirds  of the  original  wage 
difference between men  and women through  the integration of human capital, job-
related and company-related variables in our regression model. The unexplained wage 
gap of 8.1  % can partly be due to discrimination. In order to be sure that the existing 
wage  differential  is  attributable  to  labor  market  discrimination,  it  is  necessary  to 
remove all  the effects of a wide range of wage-determining factors,  including those 
that may reflect discrimination outside of the labor market (Gunderson, 1989). In our 
regression model, we  have tried to consider as much relevant variables as  possible. 
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of the unexplained gender wage 
gap  is  a proxy for the effects  on wages  of some  omitted variables (e.g.,  household 
responsibili  ties). 
24 4.  Do male-female wage differences rise with hierarchical level? 
The previous part still detected a v/age difference betv'leen men and women of 8.1  0/0, 
after  including  human  capital, job and  organization  characteristics.  In  this  part we 
start from  the  glass ceiling hypothesis,  stating that,  not  only it  is  more difficult for 
women  than  for  men  to  be  promoted  up  levels  of  authority  hierarchies  within 
workplaces, but also that the obstacles women face relative to men become greater as 
they  move  up  the  hierarchy  (Baxter  &  Wright,  2000).  We  will  translate  this 
hypothesis into reward terminology. Our fourth hypothesis then becomes: not only do 
women  experience  wage  inequalities  in  general  (cf.  part  3),  these  wage 
inequalities increase as women move up the hierarchy. In other words, the wage 
inequalities  women  face  relative  to  men  intensify  as  they  move  up  organizational 
hierarchies. 
In our model we defined three hierarchical levels. A first level consists of the heads of 
the  corporate  departments  who  report  directly  to  the  general  manager,  and  the 
managers  who  are  in  charge  of implementation  but  do  not  report  directly  to  the 
general  director.  Professionals  represent  the  second  level.  These  are  employees  in 
staff departments or staff positions. Finally, operational staff is understood as workers 
-----w·-h(j-e-arr-y-(jtl-t-a-e-1-ea-r-l-y-cle-fiT1ecl-t~a_s-k-i-fi-a-s-a:b6rd-i-n-ate-r01e,-f6r-e*-a-mpl-e--a-b00*k:eepe-r~----
who works under an administrative director. 
We  ran  separate  regression  analyses  for  each  hierarchical  level  and  examined the 
gender coefficient. The following table shows the parameter estimates, as  well as the 
fit of the model. A greater amount of the total variance is  explained by the included 
individual, job-related and  organizational  variables  in  the  highest hierarchical  level 
case. This is consistent with the logic that wages on lower levels are often determined 
by  collective  (sectoral)  agreements  rather  than  by  individual,  job-related  and 
organizational features. 
25 Table 9: Comparison of gender parameter on tbree hierarchical levels 
R' (Adj R')  Gender parameter  Exponentiated 
estimate after logarithmic  gender parameter 
transformation  estimate 
Regression with managers  .448 (.444)  -.101  .9039 
Regression with professionals  .428 (.422)  -.0819  .9214 
Regression with operational staff  .409 (.404)  -.0752  .9275 
With respect to  the gender coefficients, our models illustrate that the gender pay gap 
gets wider the higher one climbs on the hierarchical ladder. Female managers earn on 
average 9.61  % less than male managers. The average gross monthly wage of female 
professionals  is  7.86  %  smaller  than  that  of male  professionals.  Finally,  female 
members of the  operational staff earn 7.25  % less  than  their male counterparts. We 
observe that the gender wage gap on the professional level does not differ much from 
that on the operational level. Wage inequalities between men and women especially 
increase  on  management  level.  Hypothesis  4  can  be  confirmed,  but  based  on  the 
results  we  prefer to  formulate  it  differently:  not  only  do  women  experience wage 
inequalities  in  general,  these  wage  inequalities  increase  as  women  move  up  to 
management level. 
Compensation  is  object  of  negotiation  on  higher  hierarchical  levels,  especially 
management levels.  While sectoral job classifications  are  often  used as  a basis  for 
compensation on lower levels, this is rarely the case at management level (Seghers & 
van der Hallen,  1994). Senior and middle managers are outside collective bargaining 
coverage.  Since  pay  levels  at  lower  levels  are  mostly  determined  by  collective 
(sectoral) agreements, there is  less opportunity for pay inequalities for equal work. A 
possible  explanation  for  the  larger  gender  wage  gap  at  management  level  is  the 
dominancy of men in  negotiations.  A question often  raised is:  "Would women earn 
more if they bargained more like men"? The fact  is  that women tend to have lower 
pay  aspirations  than  do  rnen  regardless  of occupational  field.  Our  Salary  survey 
showed that  wage  aspirations  of men  are  5  %  higher  than  those  of women.  Men 
expect a future  pay level  that is  25.659  %  higher than their current pay level, while 
26 women expect a future pay level that is 20.436 % higher. Lower wages emerge as one 
consequence of lower pay aspirations. Besides, women's lower pay aspirations may 
partly influence their initial wage offer. According to Stuhlmacher &  Walters (1999), 
it  is  possible that  a few'  hundred  dollars  more  in  wage is  less  important  for  women 
than forming and maintaining an interpersonal relationship. Women tend to make less 
counter offers  (or less  offensive counter offers)  than  men  during  pay  negotiations. 
Men use more active negotiation tactics (asking for a larger salary than that offered). 
Women  are  more  indirect  in  their  self-promotion  tactics  (e.g.  emphasizing  their 
motivation to work hard). Gender stereotyping also results in the differential valuation 
of women and men  by male negotiators:  beliefs that women  are  willing to  work for 
less payor deserve less pay than men  remain common. It  appears that women have 
little control over some  aspects of the  pay negotiation such  as  negotiator bias  with 
regard to  the initial  and final  wage  offer.  Moreover, women  are often not  aware of 
what male peers earn or they compare themselves with other women colleagues that 
are also underpaid. So, this comparison will not reveal the top of the scale for wages 
at a similar rank (Rose & Danner, 1998). 
Stuhlmacher & Walters (1999) argue that in  wage  negotiations, even a small gender 
difference in  outcomes would be perpetuated through increases based on percentage 
of pay. This effect could be magnified if women are less effective than men in future 
pay  negotiations.  A small effect size in  negotiation outcome could have substantial 
impact  on  promoting  a  gender-based  wage  differential  in  organizations.  In  the 
following part, where  we  examine the  evolution of the  gender earnings gap  during 
careers,  we will  see that differences  in  starting wages  have  a continuous impact on 
later wages.  In  our regression model  (part 3)  we  have considered the role played by 
demand  side  issues  (e.g.  job segmentation  processes)  and  supply  side  issues  (e.g. 
human  capital,  employee  choices)  in  creating  and  maintaining  the  wage  gap. 
Negotiator effectiveness is  yet  another supply side contribution  to disparities  in pay 
between men and women. 
Apart from the impact of negotiation on  the  gender wage  gap,  we  also mention the 
effect of promotions on the gender wage differential (cf.  Booth et aI.,  1998).  If men 
27 and  women  would  be  promoted  at  roughly  the  same  rate,  the  effect  of  these 
promotions on  the  growth  of wages  is  likely to  exacerbate the  already large gender 
gap in  wages. Men continue to gain  wage increases from promotions that occurred 3 
to  5  years  before,  while  \~lOmen do  not.  Promoted  women  often  receive  a one-off 
wage increase, but then find it hard to rise in  the wage scales after promotion. Booth 
and others use the term 'sticky floors' to describe this situation. 
5.  The evolution of the gender wage gap during careers 
Only  a  very  limited  number of studies  focused  on  wage  discrimination  at  various 
stages of individuals' careers. Gerhart (1990) compared gender differences in current 
and  starting  salaries  in  one  single  firm.  Fuller  &  Schoenberger  (1991)  examined 
wages of female and male graduates with business degrees over the first five years of 
their career and found a widening gender gap. Graham et al.  (2000) intuitively noted 
that starters are less susceptible to  discriminatory forces  with respect to  pay.  Rubery 
(1995)  mentioned  the  increasing  inequality  between  men  and  women  over  their 
working lives. Not much empirical evidence on the evolution of the gender wage gap 
during careers is  available.  We hope  to  fill  this gap by comparing the  gender wage 
gap  among  starters  with  the  gender  wage  gap  among  employees  with  more  work 
experience. 
In this part we test two hypotheses: The starting pay for women is not equal to the 
starting pay for men, in  other words, women are already faced with a pay handicap 
at the starting line (hypothesis 5). The wage gap between men and women enlarges 
as  careers  progress  (hypothesis  6).  In  order to  test  these  hypotheses  we  ran  two 
similar regression models. In the first model we selected only those respondents with 
5 years  of work experience or less.  We called this group  the "starters". The second 
regression model focused on respondents  having a work experience between  15  and 
25  years. This group is  named "experienced workers". The following table gives the 
gender parameter estimates, as well as the fit of the model. 
28 Table 10: Comparison of gender parameter for starters and experienced workers 
.  [ 
K- V,"UJ K-)  UenUer parameLer eSLIrnme  r:.xponeHuaLeu 
after logarithmic  gender parameter 
transformation  estimate 
Regression with starters  .388 (.382)  -.0574  .9442 
Regression with experienced workers  .504 (.498)  -.104  .9012 
A greater amount of the  total  variance is  explained by the  included individual, job-
related  and  organizational  variables  in  the  "experienced  workers"  case.  It seems 
reasonable that job-related and organizational factors start to have an impact on wages 
after a few years of work.  An interesting example is hierarchical level: almost no one 
enters  the  labor market in  the  role  of general manager.  The  influence on  wages  of 
being  a manager is  felt  only  after  some  years  (after  someone  is  promoted to  this 
level).  The  wage  dispersion  is  smallest  in  entry-level  jobs.  The  variables  that 
predominantly explain wage differences in entry-level jobs are the individual factors, 
to a large extent the educational level. 
In the category of respondents  with  5 years of work experience or less, we  observe 
that women earn 5.58% less than men. This difference rises up till 9.88% for workers 
with 15 to 25  years of work experience. These figures illustrate that women are faced 
with a pay handicap at the starting line,  but moreover,  they build up a disadvantage 
relative to  men. The pay gap between men and women enlarges as  careers progress. 
We accept hypotheses 5 and 6.  Rubery (1995) argues that gender pay inequality has a 
life cycle dimension, by that she means the increasing  inequality between men and 
women over their working lives. Women, who do  not  start out at the same pay level 
as men with comparable credentials, have to play catch-up for the rest of their careers 
(Brett &  Stroh,  1999). Gender differences in  starting pay can be quite consequential 
over time (Graham et a!.,  2000; Gerhart,  1990). This is  because organizations' merit 
pay raises are often based upon current salary level, such that the lower the salary, the 
lower  the  raise.  Since  merit  raises  are  added  into  base  salary,  an  initial  gender 
29 difference  is  compounded  over  time.  Additional  penalties  can  result  as  workers 
progress in  their careers, since incentive bonuses are often paid as  a percent of salary. 
Besides,  other organizations consider salary  history in  making offers,  which would 
also magnify the impact of gender differences in starting salary. 
Wage differences for women at the beginning of their career can again have several 
causes. It  is possible that women choose fields of education that have a lower pay-off 
than  typically  male  study  domains  (engineering,  information  technology,  etc.) 
(Strober,  1990).  Other  explanations  direct  at  discrimination  (cf.  supra:  statistical 
discrimination). 
Women also build up  a pay disadvantage in  comparison  with men because of their 
periodic use of career interruptions (Strober,  1990). Career interruptions are thought 
to reduce women's wages relative to men's for at least three reasons (Albrecht et a!., 
1999). First, wages tend to  rise with work experience (Mincer,  1993), and time spent 
away  from  work  is  experience  foregone.  Rubery  et  a!.  (1997)  discuss  the 
disadvantages  of seniority-based pay  for  women  due  to  their career  interruptions. 
Swaffield (2000)  argues that there is  a lack of options  for  lower paid women with 
children to stay in the labor market due to the relative costs of childcare to their wage. 
This produces  a vicious circle of low wages  causing interruptions and  interruptions 
causing low wages. Second, it is  thought that,  anticipating future work interruptions, 
women choose (or are assigned to) jobs with  less potential for training. Finally, time 
out of the workforce appears to lead to a loss in subsequent earnings greater than can 
be explained solely by foregone experience: this is the result of skill atrophy or human 
capital depreciation. Albrecht et a!.  (1999), however, demonstrate that the influence of 
career  interruption  on  pay  development  depends  greatly  on  the  nature  of  the 
interruption, and that the negative effect of interruptions on the development of pay is 
significantly stronger among men than among women. 
Further arguments for the increasing wage gap as  work experience rises are grounded 
in  the fact that the pay of recent graduates may be  more directly tied to market pay 
rates than the pay of workers employed by one firm for a number of years. The latter 
30 may  be  more  susceptible  to  non-market  or discriminatory  forces  (Graham  et  aI., 
2000).  Besides,  women  may  have  fewer  employment  alternatives  at  other  firms 
several  years  into  their  careers,  due  to  spousal  constraints,  or  household 
responsibilities.  Job  applicants  who  have  alternate  job  offers  will  have  more 
bargaining power and will be more likely to negotiate, with an increased chance on a 
higher salary offer (Collins et aI.,  1998). If women  indeed have fewer employment 
alternatives after a few years, they will probably not introduce negotiations. 
Rubery (1995) proposes one solution to counteract the increasing inequality between 
men  and  women  over  their  working  lives.  Performance-related  pay  could provide 
some compensation for discrimination in  promotion between men  and women. If a 
spin off from performance-related pay is  a more systematic performance appraisal, 
women could benefit from less discrimination in the promotion system. More women 
will  probably  receive  higher  pay  for  their  performance  within  the  job category. 
Although this is  the less favorable outcome than job promotion it could still be very 
important for individual women. 
31 6.  Concluding remarks 
We have analyzed the gender wage gap using data from a salary survey, organized by 
the Department of Applied Economics of the KU  Leuven and the job advertisement 
paper Vacature. In many ways we take a new  approach to  the analysis of the gender 
wage gap. We try to explain the  gender wage gap by including productivity-related, 
job and organization characteristics in one model, while previous studies rather focus 
on  one or two groups of characteristics.  We also test whether the  wage  inequalities 
women face increase or decrease with hierarchical level and with work experience. 
Firstly we examined whether male and female earnings still differed after controlling 
for  individual, job-related and  organizational  characteristics.  The  regression  results 
show  that  adjusting  for  both  supply- and  demand-side  factors  does  not  totally 
eliminate the pay differential favoring men.  Women's earnings are, ceteris paribus, 
8.1  %  lower  than  those  of  men.  Many  alternative  explanations  for  these  pay 
differentials  between  men  and  women  have  seen  the  light.  According  to  human 
capitalists, the gender wage differential is stemming from women's own choices. The 
human capital school expects that women will interrupt their careers more frequently, 
which causes their labor force skills to depreciate. The inclusion of the human capital 
or productivity-related variables has reduced the gender wage gap with approximately 
6  percent,  but  a  wage  gap  still  exists  after  controlling  for  work  experience  and 
educational level.  Another group  of theories,  applicable  here,  are  the  segmentation 
theories.  Some groups of workers  have more difficulty in  gaining access to certain 
types of  jobs, because employers select candidates on the basis of individual or group 
characteristics. Women are  often  at the end of a labor queue when it comes to jobs 
with the highest pay and/or the best career prospects. Women frequently end up, from 
the start, in positions, which form part of a less promising career path. These theories 
possibly  offer  an  explanation  for  the  wage  gap,  which  decreases  with  8  %  after 
including  job  characteristics.  Nevertheless,  the  question  remains  whether  women 
perform certain jobs because they  prefer those jobs, or because they  are  excluded 
from better-paid positions. The finding that a large part of the gender wage gap is due 
to  differences in  the jobs men  and  women do,  suggests  a  greater potential role for 
32 equal  opportunity  policies  (Gunderson,  1989).  One  of the  issues  discussed  at  the 
European  Council  meeting  in  Nice  (7th  - 10th  of  December  2000)  was  the 
reinforcement of initiatives  and  actions  designed to  promote equality between men 
and  women  at  work,  particularly  as  regards  pay.  The  organization  characteristics 
included into our regression model did not contribute much to the explanation of the 
gender wage differential. Future research can  concentrate more on the impact of the 
organization on  wage differences between men  and women. We were able to explain 
almost two thirds  of the original wage difference between men  and women through 
the  integration of human-capital, job and organization variables  into our regression 
model.  We cannot rule out the possibility that part of the unexplained gender wage 
gap is a proxy for the effects on  wages of some omitted variables, such as  household 
responsibilities, performance of men and women in specific jobs, etc. 
With respect to the second research question "Do earnings differences between men 
and women increase with hierarchical level", the figures teach us that the wage gap 
increases when one is  climbing the  hierarchical ladder.  The  wage  gap is  largest on 
management  level.  Compensation  mostly  is  object  of  negotiation  on  higher 
hierarchical  levels,  while  sectoral job classifications  are  often  used  as  a basis  for 
compensation  issues  on  lower  levels.  In  other  words  there  is  more  room  for 
negotiating one's salary the higher one climbs in the organizational hierarchy. Women 
seem to  have  a weaker position  in  negotiations,  partly  because  of their lower pay 
expectations. 
Thirdly,  we concluded that women start with a pay handicap compared to men, and 
they  are  even  building  up  an  increasing  pay  disadvantage  in  their further  career. 
Gender differences  in  starting  salaries  can  be  quite  consequential  over time.  Since 
merit  raises  are  often  added  into  base  salary,  an  initial  gender  difference  is 
compounded  over  the  years.  Also  career interruptions  have  a continuous  negative 
impact on  women's wages  (e.g.,  seniority-based pay).  Rubery et al.  (1997)  already 
detected the  advantages and  disadvantages of different payment systems for women. 
Future research  can focus  on  women's and  men's perceptions  of justice of several 
reward systems.  Another research suggestion concerns the survey design.  Instead of 
33 using a cross-sectional design, it could be interesting to  do  a longitudinal survey and 
compare  the  wages  of the  same  group  of workers  (men  and  women)  at  different 
moments in their career. 
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36 APPENDIX 
The job characteristics 'responsibility in the job', 'autonomy'  and  'degree of  complexity'  are 
the  results  of a  personal  assessment  by  the  respondents.  A  battery  of items  was  put  to 
respondents  in  the questionnaire,  each  of which  had  to  be  evaluated  on  a four-point  scale 
(ranging from disagree completely to  agree  completely). The three  variables responsibility, 
autonomy and complexity are composed on  the basis of a factor analysis  (varimax rotation 
method). The factor loadings are presented in the table. Following a reliability analysis, three 
ten-point  scales  were  constructed  on  the  basis  of these  items,  which  show  the  degree  of 
responsibility, autonomy and complexity as assessed by the respondent. 
Factor analysis on items concerning responsibility, complexity, and autonomy (n =  20121) 
Factor loadings 
Responsibility  Complexity  Autonomy 
I have a good deal of responsibility for other people's work  .819 
I often have to take decisions in which a mistake could have  .702 
expensive or seriolls consequences 
I carry a good deal of responsibility for the future of others  .708 
I carry a good deal of responsibility for the functioning of a  .798 
department or team 
Much of my work is routine 
-.640 
My work consists almost entirely of difficult tasks 
.688 
My job demands a high degree of skill 
.720 
My job demands that I constantly learn new things 
.743 
My superior is constantly looking over my shoulders  .698 
I can decide for myself how I do my work  -.793 
My working method is largely prescribed 
.753 
I decide for myself when I carry au t a task  -.723 
My work rate is imposed entirely by others 
.675 
Reliability analysis (Cronbachs alpha)  .7784  .6772  .7815 
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